Abstract
Preface
As far back as I can remember, I wanted to fly. I could not think of any better feeling than to slip the proverbial surly bonds of earth and blast into the wild blue yonder.
However, not long after I graduated from Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), I became aware of another, more sinister side of aviation. In those first few years of flying, I
learned how many good men and women die each year in aircraft related mishaps. It seemed for a while that a month did not go by where I did not hear of a friend or classmate who had perished in an aircraft mishap. As a young officer, I vividly remember talking with an Academy classmate several days before he was killed in his RF-4. At the time, it seemed as if his life was yet another chapter in the ever increasing book of friends who had met an untimely death practicing our chosen profession.
After numerous incidents such as this, I decided to study the safety process and try to prevent others from dying. I became the squadron safety officer for a reconnaissance squadron, an airlift squadron, and an academic student squadron and eventually rose to serve as the wing chief of flying safety. I have attended the 6 week flight safety officer's course and have since investigated numerous Class A, B, and C mishaps. All told, I have spent 9 of my 13 rated years in the Air Force as a safety officer. Through my experiences,
I have determined that the Air Force has a solid investigation system that works most of the time, but is not at all perfect. Although I have approached this project in a very sound vii and logical manner, I have personally seen the system at its worst and witnessing this has added personal motivation to improve it.
Finally, I want to thank Major Tony "Rooster" Klucking for his guidance, inspiration and encouragement in this project. He has been an enormous help to me in preparing this project, but even more importantly, he has provided a professional sounding board for me to express my personal views on safety issues. He is an officer who, like me, sees the safety investigation system not so much for what it is, but what it can be, and is not afraid to get "out of the box" to help it succeed.
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Abstract
This paper addresses problems inherent in the aircraft mishap investigation system currently utilized by the United States Air Force. Specifically, it focuses on the position of the Safety Investigation Board (SIB) president. Currently, the USAF is experiencing three major problems with this position-impartiality, training, and operational effects. The current system lacks impartiality because it uses senior active duty officers who are simultaneously part of the Air Force system they are investigating. It suffers from poor training because these senior officers often have no time to devote to safety training.
Finally, it causes undesirable operational effects because it requires these SIB presidents to forsake their daily responsibilities to conduct the investigation.
This paper uses original research to propose an unconventional solution to these problems-the use of retired senior officers. Essentially, this author proposes hiring recently retired O-6 and O-7 officers to serve as board presidents. The Air Force can accomplish this by either maintaining a pool of retired officers, or contracting it out to a private firm.
The significance of this proposal is two-fold. First, it improves the efficient use of human resources in mishap investigations; and second, it provides an independent and objective senior officer to lead these investigations. If implemented, this proposal will enhance the USAF safety system--saving lives and increasingly scarce resources.
Introduction
Late in 1907, Major General J. Franklin Bell, the newly appointed U. S. 
Problem Definition
The above chart also shows that fiscal year 1991 was a great year for Air Force aviators; experiencing the fewest mishap fatalities ever. However, this year was far from perfect. In 1991, the Air Force lost 18 people and destroyed 38 aircraft. This demonstrates an important point; no matter how successful we are in reducing mishaps, there is always room for improvement. Consequently, if the Air Force is really serious about continuing mishap reduction, they must make constant improvements to the current safety system.
Accepting the status quo will not bring any further reduction in mishaps. Reducing the number of mishaps can only result from critically evaluating the investigation process and asking how we can improve it. This paper critically examines the USAF safety investigation system by evaluating the SIB composition and proposing improvements.
Specifically, it looks at the problems of impartiality, training, and operational readiness, and attempts to mitigate these problems through the effective use of retired senior officers.
It is not designed to be a radical change to the current system, just a minor adjustment to help make "zero mishaps" a reality.
Thesis
Currently, the USAF is experiencing three major problems with the SIB president's position-impartiality, training, and operational effects. First, the current system suffers from a perceived lack of impartiality. Board presidents feel pressure to conform their investigation reports to higher echelons' wishes of causal factors rather than conducting a completely independent investigation. Second, the Air Force has a hard time maintaining the training these senior officers require. Although the Air Force desires a high ranking officer (colonel or above) to serve as the SIB president, theses same officers often do not have the time to dedicate to safety training. Finally, the current system causes undesirable operational effects. Because these individuals are usually serving in command positions, the Air Force suffers some loss of operational readiness when they relieve these officers from their daily tasks to fill SIB duties. This proposal addresses the problems of impartiality, training, and operational effects by researching the feasibility of manning the board president's position with a retired flight rated colonel or general officer. Because these individuals are no longer on active duty, they are not vulnerable to external pressures from the chain of command. Additionally since they are no longer responsible for a fulltime command, they can focus their efforts in the safety field and remain current in their SIB duties. By utilizing retired individuals with a great deal of flying and command experience to man these positions, the USAF avoids taxing its current command structure with SIB duties
Research Scope
As stated earlier, this paper critically examines the USAF flight mishap investigation system by evaluating the SIB composition and proposing improvements. Although there are many safety issues that invite attention, the scope of this paper is confined to the SIB president. Furthermore, despite the fact that there are varying degrees of mishap seriousness, this paper considers only Class A mishaps (the Air Force's most serious mishaps-involving death or more than $1 million damage). 2 Therefore, though the author has narrowed the scope of this paper to evaluate only the president's position on Class A safety investigation boards, the benefits of this proposal positively impact the entire safety system.
Research Significance
If the Air Force accepts this proposal, it will solve many of the current problems in today's SIB process and will result in more accurate and efficient investigations.
Specifically, this proposal removes the current dilemma board president face; determining and reporting the truth without fear of reprisal. Additionally, it provides more continuity and training in the mishap investigation process and reduces detrimental operational effects through improved use of personnel resources. This improvement in accuracy and efficiency should reduce fatalities and preserve precious USAF material resources.
Although it requires funding to establish, the Air Force will more than recover the costs the first time these changes save a life or prevent a mishap.
Literature Review
The problems involving the SIB president are not new. 
Current Safety Investigation Problems
If the wheel ain't broke-Make it better.
-Unknown

Introduction
This chapter discusses some of the problems associated with the USAF's current SIB process, specifically concentrating on three main areas-impartiality, training, and operational effects. The first problem is the inappropriate command influence the chain of command often exerts on the board president during a mishap investigation, diminishing his or her impartiality. The next problem concentrates on the severe lack of training that our current eligible board presidents posses. The final problem focuses on the negative operational effects endured by the SIB president's permanent unit when an investigation requires them to leave their normal duties for an extended period of at least 30 days.
These three problems strain the USAF's current mishap investigation system, reducing the credibility of the final SIB products.
Problems With The Current System Impartiality
Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines impartiality as unbiased, not partial, and just. 1 The concept of impartiality is extremely important in the credibility of the safety process.
In safety terms, this concept of impartiality means that the mishap investigation board considers all the facts surrounding the mishap to render an unbiased and just evaluation.
Most professionals involved in an aircraft mishap are willing partners in the investigation of that mishap as long as they feel the investigators are just. However, once investigators allow external factors to bias the outcome of the process, this cooperation quickly ends.
So how well does the current USAF system incorporate this concept of impartiality?
According to some high ranking officials, the USAF does a poor job incorporating impartiality into the mishap investigation process. Mr. Alan Deihl, a former senior safety official at the USAF Safety Agency at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, alleged that the Air Force covered up, misclassified, and mishandled numerous investigations of aircraft accidents. 2 Mr. Deihl went on to say that during his 7 year career at the Safety Agency, he witnessed dozens of tainted investigations. Furthermore, he stated that he believes investigators are becoming more concerned about shielding senior commanders than preventing future accidents. or staff attempts to inappropriately direct safety investigation board findings or recommendations. 8 The fact that a significant portion of those holding these views have safety investigation board experience is an important consideration.
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Overall, 11 percent of the respondents and 23 percent of the flight safety officers
(generally the most current and trained board members) reported they were aware of an Air Force safety investigation that provided inaccurate results. When asked how they knew, nearly 30 percent claimed first hand knowledge. 10 Faced with such indisputable evidence by both high ranking safety officials and field level experts, the Air Force must accept that there is a clear lack of impartiality within the current system.
Training
According to Air Force Instruction 91-204, board presidents on Class A mishaps must be a pilot or a navigator in the rank of colonel or higher. 11 The purpose behind these requirements is to provide the SIB a board president with the operational and professional experience that only a senior rated officer can provide. Additionally, the added "horsepower" associated with these senior grades, ensures the SIB obtains the needed resources and overcomes the miscellaneous obstacles to the truth. The maturity, experience, and "horsepower" this officer brings to the board enhances the credibility of the entire investigation process. However, while this requirement for a senior Air Force officer provides the attributes the system requires, it is often a double edged sword. The operational experience they bring is a time consuming, career long attribute that leaves little time for acquiring, honing, or maintaining skills specific to the SIB process.
During the Blue Ribbon Panel survey, nearly half of the wing commanders and wing chiefs of safety indicated they had not attended the flight safety investigation course. 12 Safety officials designed this particular course to teach flight safety professionals the entire mishap investigation process, qualifying each graduate as a Flight Safety Officer (FSO).
Since this is a long 6 week course, it is not surprising that many of the people destine to be board presidents have not attended. However, only 15 percent of these same individuals ever attended the condensed, 2 week Aircraft Mishap Investigation Course (AMIC). This is a disturbing fact as it indicates that at least 35 percent of all wing commanders and chiefs of safety never attended a formal safety investigation course. These formal safety investigation courses should not be confused with the 2 to 3 day administration courses many of them attended. For example, the chief of safety course teaches new wing chiefs of safety how to administer their day to day responsibilities while only the FSO and AMIC courses teach you how to actually investigate a mishap.
Another concern stems from the survey lumping wing commanders and chiefs of Another important factor is that these individuals often experience a high turnover rate, staying in their assignment for only 1 to 2 years. This lack of continuity further exacerbates the training issue. The bottom line is that the one person who is in the best position to establish the impartiality of the investigation process-the SIB president-is often the least experienced and poorest trained board member. Having received little or no formal safety training, the SIB president must often learn the ropes on the job.
Although this is not the case in every instance, the fact that it happens at all severely reduces the credibility of the resulting final report. However, there is an additional issue the USAF must address; the strain that a mishap investigation causes on the board president's unit during his or her absence.
Operational Effects
As stated earlier, the individuals qualified to perform board president duty usually come from the senior echelons of operational units. The following story from Flying Safety magazine, describes what happens in those first critical hours after a serious aircraft mishap:
It was 0645, and I had just returned from my morning jog. My wife called to say the command post was on the line. Nothing terribly unusual about that, given the wing commander was away. However, my sensors quickly went on alert when the duty controller said there was an Air Mobility Command general officer requesting a phone patch with me.
The patch took seconds to complete. The message took a bit longer to digest. "The commander wants you to proceed to another Air Force Base to investigate an airlift aircraft mishap. How soon can you get there?"
My commander was off station. I was in charge. Surely there must be someone else available, especially since my boss was away and, thus, incur a dual absence. My comments were noted, but again I was asked how soon I could be there. After asking some questions of the transportation management office, I informed the general the earliest I could be there would be the next morning. That was not good enough. I was told a C-21 would be waiting for me in 2 hours. I would proceed to the site via Scott AFB for further instructions so as to be in place by midnight. There are currently 4,158 colonels in the USAF. However, there are only 140 brigadier generals.
14 Converting wing commander billets from O-6 to O-7 shifted many responsibilities from a large colonel pool to a much smaller brigadier general pool.
Because of the requirements of being a flag officer as well as a wing commander, current wing commanders find themselves stretched to the limit, spending more time off station on Temporary Duty (TDY) then was traditionally the case. These additional TDYs include promotion boards, CORONA conferences, and other high level meetings.
As a result, many of the daily functions of the wing fall to the vice wing commander or the various group commanders. Pulling any of these individuals from the unit on a no-notice and extended basis degrades the operational readiness of that unit. This operational readiness is already strained to the limit by the fact that Air Force personnel are currently spending over 85 percent more time TDY then they were just 4 years ago.
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Bringing The Problem Into Focus
Having established the inherit SIB problems of lack of impartiality, poor training, and degraded operational readiness, the focus of this paper can now shift to determine how to correct these problems. The key to correcting these problems is the USAF's method for selecting the SIB president. Clearly, the board president is in a unique position to ensure the impartial direction of any mishap investigation. While the other board members are specialists in their particular area of expertise, they work for and at the discretion of the board president. The board president is in charge and his or her position is the final position. Therefore, any attempt to improve the entire SIB process, must focus on the proper and unbiased leadership provided by the president.
The board president is also at the heart of the training issue. It is the board president who usually lacks the proper SIB training to accomplish assigned duties. The president usually comes from a high tempo billet and rarely has the time available to receive proper SIB training. Conversely, the other members of the SIB are usually much more current and qualified in their assigned tasks.
Finally, the board president is central to the readiness problem. Although all units suffer when a key member leaves to man a SIB, because the president usually holds a position of considerably greater responsibility in his or her home unit, the effects are even more acute. Thus, the focus in fixing all the problems described in this chapter must center on the board president.
Summary
This chapter established a foundation for the SIB problems currently facing the Air person that has the ultimate authority and obligation to ensure the report is truthful.
Notes Solution
Look not mournfully to the past; it comes not back again. Wisely improve the present; it is thine.
-Henry Wadsworth Longfellow
Chapter Introduction
Thus far, this paper identified the three major problems inherent in the current USAF mishap investigation system-impartiality, training, and operational effects. This chapter proposes a solution to these problems by employing recently retired colonel and general officers to serve as presidents for future SIBs.
Proposal Options
There are two basic variations to this proposal. First, the USAF can establish and maintain an Air Force Managed Pool of retired officers to serve on a consultant basis as SIB presidents. Second, the USAF can establish a Contracted Pool through a private firm to accomplish this task.
Air Force Managed Pool
Under the first variation of this proposal, the Air Force identifies qualified senior rated officers who have recently retired or are in the process of retirement, and solicits their participation in this program. To get this program started, they receive training in aircraft mishap investigation procedures and maintain their safety investigation currency through a local flying safety office. Once entered into this pool, they will serve as SIB presidents about once a year. By limiting their eligibility to 5 years from their date of retirement, the Air Force can ensure they are reasonably current with present military aviation issues.
Contracted Pool
Under the second variation of this proposal, instead of the Air Force establishing and maintaining a pool of retired officers, they contract the job out to a private firm. The primary advantage of this proposal is that a private firm then pays the individual participants rather than the US Government, simplifying federal pay and benefits issues.
This would essentially become a full time or semi-full time job for the retired officer, paying big dividends in the experience level of future board presidents. The Air Force would simply include the 5 year currency limit as well as the basic minimum requirements in the contract. Under this variation, the Air Force can expect a reduction in the total size of the pool, since each member would probably serve more than once a year.
Proposal Rational
The intent of the regulatory requirement for all Class A mishaps to have an O-6 or higher as the board president is to ensure that the president provides both the leadership and the rank to overcome obstacles. Clearly, the Air Force requires this professional leadership in a body that both determines the cause of the mishap and recommends changes to prevent further occurrence. As the chart on the next page depicts, the number of aircraft destroyed in Class A mishaps has fallen steadily over the past 20 years; a trend the Air Force would like to continue. There is no doubt that one of the major contributors to this downward trend is the professional leadership provided by past SIB presidents and the sound recommendations their investigations have produced. The first and most important aspect of this proposal is the retired officer's impartiality.
Impartiality
According to the BRPAS report, there is a documented perception among Air Force personnel that the convening authority often sacrifices the quality of mishap board results by using board president duty as an O-6 screening test. 1 Although the panel could not specifically substantiate the reality of this perception, they did acknowledge the fact that some MAJCOMs tend to select their board presidents based on their current positions rather than their safety qualifications. A retired colonel or general officer is above any such career building criticism.
Although these retired officers are immune from most career criticisms, it would be naive to think they were totally isolated from the active duty officer corps. In most cases these retired officers still have many active duty connections which can aid them in their investigation. However, these SIB presidents could find themselves in a situation where they are responsible for decisions that may affect the careers of these "connections."
Ultimately, this is simply part of every leader's responsibility and beyond the scope of this paper.
Thus, the fact that the outcome of the board does not have any effect on a retired officer's career makes him or her totally independent. This, by default, provides the impartiality the safety system seeks. The impartiality afforded by this proposal allows the SIB president to set a course that encompasses all relevant aspects of evidence, without external pressures to emphasize some areas and omit others. Although this aspect of impartiality alone is justification for such a change to the system, there are other important benefits that retired officers bring to the SIB process as well.
Training
One of the important practical benefits that retired Air Force officers bring to this process is their safety focus. As noted in chapter 2, many of the current officers who are on call to perform duty as a SIB president are not current or trained in their safety responsibilities. The fact that the officers involved in this process are currently filling high tempo billets makes this situation understandable, but unacceptable nonetheless. Retired officers do not have these same problems. A retired officer has the ability to focus all efforts on the SIB process without having to divide his or her time between other operational USAF areas. Thus, they can attend a full 2 week AMIC course as well as any locally generated refresher training. FSOs at each flying unit are currently performing this training so it requires no additional expenses. The Air Force can cut total expenses even further by entering an officer into this program prior to his or her official retirement. This would reduce some of the complications and costs associated with sending retired officers to active duty training courses.
Once the officer is fully trained to serve as a SIB president, the benefits of this program begin to compound quickly. According to the BRPAS, only 30 percent of all eligible wing commanders and chiefs of safety ever served on a mishap investigation board. 2 Additionally, less than 8 percent of these officers served on more than one board.
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It is important to note that these officers did not necessarily serve as the board presidents on these boards, they simply served as a member of a SIB at one point in their career.
Consequently, under the current system, the vast majority of board presidents have never served on a board before in any capacity. The results are obvious; the majority of board presidents re-invent the wheel each mishap without any of the benefits provided by experience.
This proposal fixes the experience gap. According to this proposal, the retired officer would serve at least once a year for 5 years. Although they are relatively inexperienced during their first SIB, they carry their experience into each subsequent board. This would average out to an experienced president on four out of every five boards, or 80 percent.
This sharply contrasts with the 8 percent experience rate produced by the current system.
The experience gained each time can only result in a more competent and efficient process.
Operational Effects
The final problem this proposal eliminates is the current requirement to remove senior leaders from their daily responsibilities to serve on a SIB. Although these senior leaders expect to spend a great deal of time TDY, the short notice and unexpected nature of the SIB process, coupled with the long duration required for closure, creates considerable hardship for their home unit. Utilizing retired officers precludes or at least reduces the number of times active Air Force units have to endure these hardships. Additionally, without the responsibilities of command, the board president is able to concentrate fully on the investigation without worrying about the status of his or her home unit. These changes provides more stability in the higher echelons of flying units which should result in improved operational readiness.
Matching Availability To The USAF's Flexible Needs
In this section, the author determines how many retired officers are available to participate in this program and how many the Air Force needs to maintain a flexible program.
According to the Headquarters USAF Personnel Office at the Pentagon, in calendar year 1996, 26 rated general officers and 365 rated colonels retired from active duty. 
Benefits
From the retired officer's perspective, there are two main selling points that make this proposal attractive. The first and most important point is that it offers them an opportunity to keep active in the affairs of the Air Force. The second selling point is the monetary compensation it provides.
Flexibility Benefits
Most retired officers look forward to the flexibility and relaxation that retired life provides. However, at the same time, they often have reservations about leaving an institution in which they have invested so much. This proposal allows them to do both.
By participating in this program, they can remain actively involved in the Air Force while enjoying the other benefits of retirement.
The Air Force managed pool version of this proposal employs retired officers to participate in only one investigation per year. Adding the refresher training required to maintain SIB currency, each participant can expect to serve about 45 days per year, leaving 320 days to enjoy their retirement.
The contracted pool version of this proposal attracts those retired officers who desire full time employment. These retired officers most likely will work multiple boards per year, affording them a more steady line of employment, while allowing them the flexibility they desire. For example, a retiree may remain in the pool certain months of the year and block out others. The employing firm awarded the contract works out all the final details.
In any case, both proposals include some form of pay benefits.
Pay Benefits
In order to ensure this program attracts quality people, both versions must include financial reimbursement for their period of employment to include travel and billeting expenses. Although this is not the primary motivator for a retired officer to participate in this program, a realistic and equitable sum of compensation is necessary for several reasons.
The first reason monetary compensation is necessary is that it provides a viable interest in the program. Although retired officers want to stay involved in the Air Force after they retire, the pressure and responsibility of a SIB is probably not the means they would choose without fair reimbursement. In many ways, the SIB process focuses on the Air Force at its worst. Sifting through the debris and carnage of a major aircraft mishap or listening to those last few seconds on a cockpit voice recorder is often a painful experience. Although these retired officers are prepared for such tasks, it underscores the point that a mishap investigation is a serious and sometimes unpleasant process. 
Summary
This chapter outlines the basic elements of this proposal. Both versions include the same basic concept of a pool of highly experienced, recently retired officers serving as SIB presidents. The primary difference between the two versions is whether the Air Force manages the pool or a contractor. Next, this chapter demonstrates how retired O-6 and O-7 officers have the professional maturity and experience the USAF seeks without the external pressures levied on their active duty counterparts. As a result of this proposal, retired officers will carry more impartiality, training, and experience into the SIB process.
Another benefit of this proposal is that the SIB president's home unit suffers no adverse consequences. Ultimately, this should increase the readiness of these units. Mark, and Brigadier General Joel T. Hall, USAF (Ret.). 4 Thus, the concept of using retired officers is common practice in the Air Force and not a radical departure from standard procedures.
Financial Compensation
The last chapter established the need for fair and equitable compensation. This section defines the specific amount of compensation for SIB presidents. AFMAN 36-203 addresses this issue of compensation in part 5.4.2. when it states that compensation for experts and consultants cannot exceed the maximum daily payable rate of a GS-15. 
Funding Issues
The final monetary issue this paper addresses is the USAF costs to enact this 
Introduction
This whole paper has one purpose, to critically examine the SIB president selection process and propose improvements. This final chapter specifically outlines the author's recommendation on implementing the use of retired senior officers to serve as SIB presidents.
Implementation
As mentioned before, one of the best attributes of this proposal is flexibility. Unlike many other proposals, the Air Force can initiate and test these changes on a small scale first, expanding them later when they prove successful. An Action Officer (AO) at the Air Force Safety Center at Kirtland AFB, NM, should manage this program.
The AO's first step is to solicit a volunteer for this project from the roles of retiring Brigadier Generals. This author proposes using a retiring O-7 first, and again expanding this to O-6s later as the program gains success. The AO ensures the retiring officer is fully trained for SIB duties by selecting one who has already attended a mishap investigation course. Next, the AO updates the retiring officer's currency by scheduling safety refresher training. Preferably, the AO will select a retiring officer with current flight qualifications.
Based on the following chart, representing the lifetime Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours for the 10 most common USAF aircraft, this author recommends selecting an F-16
pilot. The F-16 is the most likely airframe to suffer a mishap based on their 4 year average of 11 Class A mishaps per year. Although this proposal eventually requires a change to the SIB president requirements outlined in AFI 91-204, all that is required for the initial test board is a simple waiver. The AO from the Safety Center will accompany the retired officer throughout the investigation. After the process is complete, the AO will compile an after action report that includes the demonstrated benefits, problems encountered, and future recommendations. The Safety Center will correct any problem areas noted in this report and begin the process all over again. After three iterations of this process, the Air Force
Chief of Safety will evaluate the program and either expand it to a fully functional pool of SIB presidents, or reevaluate this proposal's merits. Only through a deliberate and comprehensive process such as this, can the Air Force hope to develop a well-managed and well-executed solution to the current problems.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to identify problems with the current USAF aircraft mishap investigation process and propose a solution. This paper has clearly identified and described three major problems with this process-impartiality, training, and operational effects. The current system lacks impartiality because it uses senior active duty officers who are subject to many influences outside the investigation, as SIB presidents. The high level testimony of Mr. Deihl and Brigadier General Hall as well as the results from the BRPAS confirm these accusations.
Additionally, this paper documents the fact that most board presidents called to preside over Class A SIBs lack the necessary training to accomplish this important task.
The realities of the day to day work load these senior officers accomplish make this situation understandable. However, this lack of training and preparation degrades the integrity of the process and is ultimately unacceptable. This problem becomes even more acute when one considers the negative operational effects caused by these senior officers'
departure from their home station to participate in an investigation. The Air Force can improve the current process and eliminate many of the major deficiencies by changing the criteria for SIB presidents.
To resolve these various problems, this project proposed allowing retired O-6 and O-7 officers to serve as board presidents. This preserves the Air Forces' desire to place only accomplished and professionally mature senior officers in the board president role, while maintaining a completely independent perspective. Next, this paper demonstrated how the proposal was fiscally possible with minimum costs. The two basic variations of this proposal are 1) maintain an Air Force managed pool of senior officers, and 2) contract the services out to a private firm. The Air Force managed pool is less costly and more flexible than the contract pool, but requires more time and effort to develop and maintain. The contract pool is easier to manage but costs the Air Force more money.
The final and most important portion of this proposal is the implementation guidelines. This portion outlines a simple plan for making the proposal happen on a trial basis. Through this plan, the Safety Center can test the waters in a conservative and painless manner. It is the author's sincere hope that by enacting the changes outlined in this paper, the Air Force will develop the mishap investigation process into a more credible and effective system. Accomplishing this saves money in the long term and protects the USAF's most valuable asset; people.
Notes
